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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LYLE C. HENDRICKS,

:

Petitioner-Appellant,

:

v.

:

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Case No. 930055-CA
Priority No. 3

Respondent-Appellee.
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of
a petition for writ of habeas corpus involving a first degree
felony. Appellee has filed a motion to transfer this appeal to the
Utah Supreme Court, based upon rule 44 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g) (Supp.
1992). Section 78-2a-3(2)(g) explicitly excludes from this Court's
jurisdiction, appeals from petitions challenging convictions of
first degree felonies.

Jurisdiction properly lies with the Utah

Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i), as this is
an appeal "from the district court involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony."
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
This case involves the summary dismissal of a petition
for writ of habeas corpus.

The issue raised on appeal is:

1

Did the district court properly dismiss the petition as
frivolous?

In reviewing a dismissal of a habeas corpus petition,

the appellate

court examines the record

"in the

light most

favorable to the findings and judgment . . . and will not reverse
if there is a reasonable basis in the record to support the trial
court's denial of the writ."

Hall v. Utah Board of Pardons, 806

P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted).

See also Waastaff

v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah App. 1990); Medina v. Cook, 779
P.2d 658 (Utah 1989); Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah
1988).
However, no deference is accorded the lower court's
conclusions of law underlying the dismissal of the petition.
Rather,

the

correctness.

appellate

court

reviews

such determinations

for

Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah 1992)

(citing Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes
or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented is
contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1987)

*Appellee relies on many documents that are not part of the
record on appeal, but were considered by the district court in
dismissing the petition. Therefore, appellee has filed a motion to
supplement the record, which is currently before this Court.

2

(Addendum A).
term of

On February 22, 1988, petitioner was sentenced to a

five years to life, along with a one year firearm

enhancement

(JEd.. ).

(Addendum B ) .

Petitioner timely appealed his conviction

On appeal, petitioner claimed that:

(1) his

admissions to police while in custody were improperly admitted at
trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction;
(3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) he was
subjected to prosecutorial misconduct (Addendum C). The Utah Court
of

Appeals

affirmed

petitioner's

conviction

in

a memorandum

decision dated February 5, 1990 (Id.).
On November 20, 1989, petitioner filed a motion for new
trial in the Second Judicial District Court (Addendum D).
motion,

petitioner

demonstrated
petitioner

claimed

that

newly

his right to a new trial

argued

discovered
(.Id. ).

In his
evidence

Specifically,

that his attorney, Stephen Laker, perjured

himself when he told the trial court that he had spoken to attorney
Scott Jensen concerning petitioner's case (Xd. at 4).
further

claimed

that

Scott

Jensen's

testimony

contradicted that of Detective Miner (JId.).

Petitioner
would

have

The district court

denied petitioner's motion for new trial on December 12, 1989,
finding that, even after a review of Scott Jensen's affidavit,
there was no substantial evidence to support petitioner's claims
(Addendum E).
On or about October 29, 1990, petitioner filed a "Motion
for an Order of Dismissal of Information" in the Second Judicial
District Court (Addendum F).

At a minimum, petitioner claimed
3

that: (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction "of the subjectmatter

of

aggravated

himself; and
conviction

robbery";

(2) Detective

Miner

perjured

(3) the evidence was insufficient to support his

(Id.. at

5,

6,

9).

The

district

court

denied

petitioner's motion to dismiss on December 26, 1990 as being wholly
without merit (Addendum G ) .
On April 27, 1992, petitioner filed a "petition for writ
of error coram nobis in trial court" in the Second Judicial
District Court (Addendum H) •

Petitioner claimed that:

trial counsel, Stephen Laker, failed to contact
previous

attorney,

Scott

Jensen, regarding

(1) his

petitioner's

Detective Miner's

testimony; (2) Detective Miner lied under oath regarding a jailroom
conversation; and (3) Scott Jensen's affidavit constituted "newly
discovered evidence" supporting petitioner's claims (.Id..). On May
15/ 1992, the district court dismissed the petition as frivolous,
on the ground that it was repetitious of motions previously made
and denied (Addendum I).
On

December

1,

1992, petitioner

filed

a

"writ of

extraordinary relief", hereinafter referred to as "petition", in
the

Second

Judicial

District

Court

(R.

1-4;

Addendum J).

Petitioner alleged that: (1) Detective Miner perjured himself; (2)
his

counsel,

Stephen

Laker, was

ineffective

for

failing

to

challenge the perjured testimony; (3) the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction; and (4) the affidavit of Scott Jensen
constituted "newly discovered evidence" (Id.).

On January 13,

1993, the district court dismissed the petition as frivolous on the

4

ground that it was "repetitious of motions previously made and
denied" (R. 13; Addendum K).

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal

in the district court on January 25, 1993 (R. 15; Addendum L ) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A statement of facts beyond those set forth in the above
Statement of the Case is not necessary to resolve the issue
presented on appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court properly dismissed as frivolous the
December

1992 petition

reviewed

the

for writ of habeas corpus; the court

file from petitioner's

criminal proceedings and

correctly determined that petitioner's allegations were repetitious
of motions previously denied.

Petitioner's claims either were

raised and litigated on appeal, or should have been raised on
appeal.

Furthermore, petitioner's claims are time-barred by the

statute of limitations.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE
PETITION AS FRIVOLOUS:
PETITIONER'S
CLAIMS EITHER WERE RAISED AND DECIDED OR
SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL.
In Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989), the Utah
Supreme Court set out the standard of review for claims previously
adjudicated on appeal.

Specifically, the Court stated that

A ground for relief from a conviction or
sentence that has once been fully and fairly

5

adjudicated on appeal or in a prior habeas
proceeding should not be readjudicated unless
it can be shown that there are "unusual
circumstances."
For example, a prior
adjudication is not a bar to reexamination of
a conviction if there has been a retroactive
change in the law, a subsequent discovery of
suppressed evidence, or newly discovered
evidence.
Lairbv v. Barnes, 793 P.2d 377 (Utah 1990) (quoting Hurst, 777 P.2d
at 1036).
himself;

Petitioner's claims that:

(1) Detective Miner perjured

(2) his counsel, Stephen Laker, was ineffective for

failing to challenge the perjured testimony; and (3) the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction, were all raised and
adjudicated on petitioner's direct appeal (Addendum C). Petitioner
claims he did not raise these claims on his appeal because he did
not have the affidavit of Scott Jensen, which he characterizes as
"newly

discovered

evidence"

(R.

2; Addendum

J).

However,

petitioner's claim is unfounded. Petitioner procured Mr. Jensen's
affidavit, which is dated December 6, 1988, several years ago, and
attached it to his motion for new trial (Addendum D).

Furthermore,

review of the appellate court's memorandum decision reveals that
petitioner submitted Mr. Jensen's affidavit to the court on his
direct appeal (Utah Court of Appeals memorandum decision dated
February 5, 1990, attached as Addendum C).

Specifically, the court

of appeals stated,
[ajppellant's claim that attorney Jensen's
testimony at trial would support appellant's
argument that Miner lied about the confessions
is unsupported by the record.
Jensen's
affidavit acknowledges that he may have been
present at the prearraignment meeting with
Miner but has no recollection of the meeting
or any discussions.
We find no error in

6

defense counsel not
witness at trial.

calling

Jensen

as

a

Id. at 4.

Since Mr. Jensen's affidavit is not newly discovered

evidence,

there

are

no

unusual

circumstances

warranting

reexamination of petitioner's claims.
Even if the exact claims contained in the petition were
not raised on appeal, petitioner is barred from now obtaining
habeas corpus relief. A writ of habeas corpus is not a substitute
for direct appeal and cannot be used to fulfill the purpose of
regular appellate review. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P. 2d 1101 (Utah
1983). See also Wacrstaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah App. 1990);
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989).

The Utah Supreme Court

has stated:
It is therefore well settled in this state
that allegations of error that could have been
but were not raised on appeal from a criminal
conviction cannot be raised by habeas corpus
or postconviction review, except in unusual
circumstances.
Codianna, 660 P. 2d at 1104.

The Court further noted that habeas

corpus may be invoked
only when the court had no jurisdiction over
the person or the offense, or where the
requirements of law have been so disregarded
that
the
party
is
substantially
and
effectively denied due process of law, or
where some such fact is shown that it would be
unconscionable
not
to
re-examine
the
conviction.
Id. at 1105 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

If the alleged

error is known or should have been known to the petitioner at the
time judgment was entered,

7

it must be reviewed in the manner and within
the time permitted by regular prescribed
procedure, or the judgment becomes final and
is not subject to further attack, except in
some such unusual circumstance as we have
mentioned above.
Were it otherwise, the
regular rules of procedure governing appeals
and the limitations of time specified therein
would be rendered impotent.
Id. (citations omitted).

Accord Gerrish v. Barnes. 844 P.2d 315

319 (Utah 1992).
Petitioner's claims should have been known to petitioner
by the time he was sentenced.

Therefore, petitioner should have

raised these claims on direct appeal.

Petitioner claims that he

did not raise the issues on direct appeal because he did not have
Scott Jensen's affidavit, which petitioner characterizes as "newly
discovered evidence", enabling him to bypass the requirement of
bringing all claims on appeal (R. 2).

However, the foregoing

demonstrates that Mr. Jensen's affidavit is not "newly discovered
evidence".

Therefore, petitioner has not demonstrated unusual

circumstances warranting his failure to raise all claims on direct
appeal. Since petitioner's claims are not proper for habeas corpus
or post-conviction relief, the district court properly dismissed
the petition as frivolous.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
THE PETITION AS FRIVOLOUS: PETITIONER'S
CLAIMS WERE REPETITIOUS OF PREVIOUS
MOTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN DENIED.
The district

court's dismissal

of

the petition

frivolous was based upon the finding that the petition

8

as
"is

repetitious of motions previously made and denied" (R. 13; Addendum
K).

A review of petitioner's file from his criminal proceedings

clearly supports the district court's conclusion.

The claims

contained in the petition were previously raised by petitioner in
his:

(1) motion for new trial; (2) motion for an order of

dismissal of information; and (3) petition for writ of error coram
nobis in trial court (Addenda D, F, and H ) .

Petitioner merely

reasserted claims previously raised and denied in order to get one
more bite at the apple. As already noted, claims which have been
previously litigated should not be reasserted in a petition for
habeas

corpus

circumstances.

or

post-conviction

relief,

See Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1036.

absent

unusual

Therefore, the

district court properly dismissed the petition as frivolous. Since
petitioner

has

failed

to demonstrate

the impropriety

of the

district court's ruling, this Court should affirm the dismissal of
the petition.
POINT III
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE TIME-BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN
UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-12-31.1.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1, which governs habeas corpus
and post-conviction relief/ provides that such actions must be
filed:
Within three months:
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus. This limitation shall apply not only
as to grounds known to petitioner but also to
grounds which in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have been known by petitioner
or counsel for petitioner.

9

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992).

Since all of petitioner's

allegations relate to matters which occurred at trial, petitioner
should have raised his claims by May 22, 1988, three months after
he was sentenced.

However, the petition was not filed until

December 1, 1992, over four years beyond the statutory period. All
of petitioner's allegations are based on grounds which were known
or should have been known by petitioner through the exercise of
reasonable diligence.

For this reason, petitioner's claims are

time-barred.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the
district court's dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus relief
as frivolous.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

M

V

day of July, 1993.

1 JLc*A % 'UuVl^
ANGELA*. MICKLOS
Assistant Attorney General

10
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IN THfe DISTRICT COURT OF
s t a t e of Utah
s t a t e OT utan,
vs.

SS^UK'BB

'WEBER
CtStiNTYy STATE OF UTAH
v:rbj_i- 1,. '. --.< Z'CtMT
*\Cu.Uh n &n:? M r
;
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND

COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE
PRISON
No. 18592

LYLE HENDRICKS
Defendant.
—00O00—

Defendant having been convicted by Bel a jury; C 1 the court; []plea of guilty;
[]plea of no ..contest; of the.offense ofj\r.r. pnpprw
, a
felony of the 1st
degree, being now present in court and ready for sentence,
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows:
Judge's
THE BASIC SENTENCE
initials
[ ] not to exceed five (5) years at the Utah State Prison;
[ ] not less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison;
{% not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison;
[ ] to pay fine in the amount of $
.
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE
Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows:
[fl one (1) year at Utah State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203(1), (2) or (3);
[ ] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3);
[ ] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison,
pursuant to 76-3-203(4);
said sentence to run consecutive to the basic sentence as set forth above.
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT
Upon a finding that the defendant Is in the status of an habitual criminal, the
defendant is sentenced to:
[ ] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison.
RESTITUTION
[ ] Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $

, tc
.

Defendant is remanded into custody of:
[ ] the Sheriff of this county, for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or
fc] the Warden for execution of this sentence.
DATED this 2?nd day of
CONCURRENT SENTENCE
ATTEST:

'J- RICHARD
//

GREENE

February

., County Clerl

, 1988

TirrRTF) JUDGE

•
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,

ooOoo
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

v.

)

Case No. 890255-CA

Lyle C. Hendricks,

)

F I L E D

)

FEB 51990

Plaintiff and Respondent,

Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Garff, Billings and Davidson.

MaryT Noontn
Clerk of t * Court
Utah Court * Appeals

PER CURIAM:
Appellant Lyle Hendricks appeals his conviction of
aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302 (1989). Following appellant's conviction, his
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was transferred to this court
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1989). In presenting his
appeal, Appellant was permitted to supplement the brief filed
by his attorney and submit his own pro jg£ arguments. We have
considered all of the issues presented in appellant's brief and
in his pro £& supplemental brief. We affirm the conviction.
We need only briefly explain appellant's crime. On the
afternoon of December 8, 1987, appellant entered Murray's
Pharmacy and walked behind the pharmacy counter. He pointed a
gun at the pharmacist and demanded all of his class II
narcotics. When the pharmacist was able to convince appellant
that he had no class II drugs, appellant turned and walked
away, muttering that he was "just fooling, anyway." Appellant
and his accomplice drove off in appellant's blue suzuki
samari. The police were notified and pursued the saroari. In
the pursuit, appellant and the accomplice jumped from the
vehicle and ran. Both were later caught and arrested.
On appeal, appellant argues that his admissions to
police while in custody were inadmissible at trial, the
evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, appellant
was denied the effective assistance of counsel and the
prosecutor committed misconduct^ Appellant's supplemental
brief does not add any substantial additional issue requiring
our discussion but merely reargues these contentions.

We observe that in pretrial lineups and at trial the
pharmacist and his assistant unequivocally identified appellant
as the robber and gave clear descriptions of the aggravated
robbery incident. Police officers testified regarding
appellant's capture and arrest and the subsequent inculpatory
statements he made after he was advised of his rights.
Appellant did not testify at trial and did not present any
evidence in his defense. Yet on appeal, appellant attempts to
bolster his pro ££ arguments by asserting facts not in the
record and by relying upon his own version of the events to
excuse his conduct. Appellant draws conclusions and asserts
motives which are not supported by any evidence at trial.
First, appellant claims that his admissions to detective
Miner at the time of arraignment, the day after appellant's
arrest, were inadmissible because appellant was not readvised
of his Miranda rights. It is undisputed that, at the time of
the arrest, appellant was advised of his rights by Detective
Miner. Appellant said he knew his rights. After the arrest,
he was advised of his rights again prior to a lineup
proceeding, expressly waived them, and initiated conversations
with police detectives. Appellant' proffered an alibi that his
friend had taken his samari, but that he, appellant, had not
been near the pharmacy. When his story was questioned,
appellant admitted that he had gone to the pharmacy to get some
cold medicine.
The next morning, while awaiting a video arraignment at
the jail, appellant asked to speak with Detective Miner.
Appellant told Miner that his own attorney had withdrawn from
representation. A legal defender attorney, Mr. Jensen, was
present to assist with other criminal arraignments and to
assist appellant in his arraignment. Jensen listened while
appellant talked to Miner. During his conversation with Miner,
appellant confessed to the crime and admitted his guilt.
Detective Miner testified at trial regarding the
admissions by appellant in this conversation. Although
appellant did not offer any rebuttal evidence at trial, he now
tries to claim that his confession was coerced and he was
improperly interrogated without the presence of his own
attorney. He relies upon the detective's failure to read him
his Miranda rights a third time before talking to him.
A Miranda warning is not required before each and every
conversation with an accused. Cf. Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S.
477, 483-5 (1981). Appellant knew and understood his rights to

counsel and to remain silent. He knowingly and voluntarily
relinquished them. The evidence is clear that appellant
himself initiated his conversation with Detective Miner.
Furthermore, his admissions were knowing and voluntary. There
was no evidence that the police exerted any improper influence
or inducement, made any threat of harm or abuse, or offered any
improper promise. And, an attorney from the legal defender's
office (who also represented defendant at trial) was present
when defendant sought out Miner in conversation. Appellant's
admissions were properly admitted into evidence. £&£ State v.
Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 466-7 (Utah 1988); State v. Moore, 697
P.2d 233, 235-6 (Utah 1985);fifififll££Oregon v. Bradshaw. 462
U.S. 1043 (1983).
Appellant also argues that the evidence is insufficient
to support the first degree felony of aggravated robbery
because defendant was "just fooling" and lacked the necessary
intent. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(3)(1989), a person
commits aggravated robbery if he uses a dangerous weapon (e.g.
automatic firearm) while attempting a robbery. Appellant's
demand for controlled narcotics was enforced by intimidation
and fear of his automatic weapon which he pointed at the
pharmacist. Testimony of appellant's conduct and demeanor were
unchallenged at trial. Whether appellant was serious, or was
not serious, and had the requisite intent to commit the robbery
was a fact for the determination of the jury. State v. Brown.
607 P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1980); State v. McQueen. 14 Utah 2d
311, 383 P.2d 921 (1963). Intent is rarely susceptable to
direct proof. To ascertain appellant's true intent, the jury
was entitled to resort to reasonable inferences based upon an
examination of all the surrounding circumstances. State v.
Gutierrez. 714 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah 1986); SS& also State v.
Rovball. 689 P.2d 1338, 1339 (Utah 1984).The evidence is not so
lacking or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have a
reasonable doubt of defendant's intent to commit a robbery,
even though the robbery was not completed. We reject
appellant's unsupported contention that the jury was "mislead"
and -lied to."
Appellant personally argues that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel at trial because his court
appointed attorney failed to adequately investigate the facts,
failed to present a defense, and had a conflict of interest.
Appellant complains that his attorney failed to discover
and bring out at trial that the pharmacist had been previously
involved in illegal distribution of controlled narcotics.

f»aftoe.*_n*

Appellant fails to show the relevance or admissibility of such
evidence at trial. The absence of such evidence to impeach the
witness was, at best, harmless error in view of the unequivocal
testimony of the other eyewitness to appellant*s crime and
defendant's admissions. Appellant fails to show that he was
unfairly prejudiced by the lack of this evidence. Moreover,
there is no basis to argue that this evidence would support a
claim that defendant was "just fooling around.9
Appellant's claim that attorney Jensen's testimony at
trial would support appellant's argument that Miner lied about
the confessions is unsupported by the record. Jensen's
affidavit acknowledges that he may have been present at the
prearraignment meeting with Miner but has no recollection of
the meeting or any discussions. We find no error in defense
counsel not calling Jensen as a witness at trial.
Appellant says he was denied a defense at trial. But he
does not articulate what defense he "insisted" be presented by
counsel and what facts would have supported that defense. Even
assuming that the defense tactics of appellant's attorney taken
at trial should not be accorded the widest latitudes, there is
no support for the contention that 'appellant was precluded from
asserting his innocence at trial. State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71,
92 (Utah 1981).
In State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court applied the principles of Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and recognized the "strong
presumption" that counsel rendered adequate assistance and
exercised reasonably professional judgment.
It is not enough to claim that the alleged
errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome or could have had a prejudicial
effect on the fact finders. To be found
sufficiently prejudicial, appellant must
affirmative show that a "reasonable
probability" exists that, but for counsel's
error, the result would have been
different. We have defined "reasonable
probability" as that sufficient to undermine
confidence in the reliability of the verdict.
[These principles] . . • are guides to
the ultimate focus upon the fundamental
fairness of the proceeding challenged . . . .
[W]e need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient if appellant fails

eoftoec_r»A

to satisfy his burden of showing that he
suffered unfair prejudice as a result of the
alleged deficiencies. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.
£££ SlSP State v. Julian. 771 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1989); StStS Vt
Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989); State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d
270 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Just as in ELSE& and Strickland, if appellant fails to show
that he was unfairly prejudiced, we need not, and
do not, agree
with appellant's lengthy arguments that counsel9s efforts at
trial were deficient. Strickland. 486 U.S. at 697. £umi£# 723
P.2d at 405. Upon the record as a whole and considering the
overwhelming evidence against appellant, we are persuaded that
the alleged errors of his trial attorney had no reasonable
effect on the verdict. Appellant does not show that, absent
the alleged errors, the result would have been different with
any reasonable probability. Our confidence in the reliability
of the verdict and the fundamental fairness of the trial is not
undermined. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.
Finally, we reject appellant's*claim of prosecutorial
misconduct because the prosecutor referred to defendant's
admissions in her closing argument and did not tell the jury
that Detective Miner was "lying". Also, there was no conflict
of interest between appellant's attorney and by Attorney
Jensen. There is not one shred of evidence in the record or
one fact identified by appellant that supports his claim of
defective counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.
We have also separately examined and reject the numerous
other contentions by appellant. They are unsupported by the
record and-we need not to discuss them here. Appellant's
conviction-is affirmed.

Kegnal W. Garff, ~Judg%

Richard C. Davidson, Judge
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AFFIDAVIT OF G. SCOTT JENSEN
I, G. SCOTT JENSEN, being first duly sworn upon oath,
depose and say as follows:
1.

That I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the

State of Utah.
2.

That on December 9, 1987 I worked on a part-time basis

with the Weber County Public Defender Association.
3.

It is possible on December 9, 1987 I stood with Mr. Lyle

C. Hendricks for an arraignment.
4.

After discussing the matter with Martin Gravis, the

history of the case sounded vaguely familiar and I might have been
the one who stood up with Lyle during his arraignment.
5.

I do not remember having an conversation with Stephen

Laker regarding Mr. Lyle Hendricks.
6.

If I was the attorney who was present with Mr. Hendricks

during his arraignment, I have no recollection of what took place at
the arraignment, or of any conversation with Stephen Laker.
DATED this

fn

day of December, 1988.

G. SCOTT JE:
Attorne:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to beforg*me
December, 1988.
My Commission Expires:

( AlLCQ

this

\JJ

day of

(/ Gjfe^^^

Residing ^^psy\jj[Xf\{}Q^

f

Ctfa/j

BOX 250
DRAPER, UTAH 84020

•"

^r^^yf

"
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
\

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
\

LYLE HENDRICKS,

Case No.

J1EC i 2 1969

\

Defendant.

871918592

Having reviewed the memoranda and affidavits on file, I
find and rule as follows:
Defendant
Jensen,
testimony
Minor.

should

have

would

that

testified

contradict

None

correspondence

alleges

of

one

of

at

his

his

trial

the testimony

defendant's

from Mr. Jensen

and

or

Scott

that

of Detective

affidavits
suggest

attorneys,

his
Shane

copies

of

that Mr. Jensen

can

recall any facts concerning this case.
Absent substantial evidence that Mr. Jensen recalls facts
significantly

inconsistent

with

the

testimony

of

Detective

Minor# I find that there is no basis for defendant's request for
a new trial.
Defendant's motion is denied.
DATED this

day of December, 1989.
BY THE CO

Page 2
Order Denying Defendant's
Motion for a New Trial
Case No. 871918592

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 1^

day of December,

1989 I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for a New Trial to counsel as follows:
Kristine M. Knowlton
Attorney for Plaintiff
7th Floor Municipal Building
Ogden, Utah 84401
Lyle C. Hendricks
defendant pro se
P. 0. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
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KSm'CT COURT
WEBE? COUNTY
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTJt<0£Cc|SRiPftF4W^ER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,

vs.

LYLE C. HENDRICKS,

Case No.

871918592

Defendant.
Having

examined

the memoranda

and

other

documents

on

file, I find and rule as follows:
I find the contentions of defendant to be totally without
merit and not worthy of further comment other than to rule that
defendant's motion is denied.
DATED this

<2£

day of December, 1990.

, Judge

Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Case No. 871918592
Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

Mi
day of December,

1990, I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss to counsel as follows:
Lyle C. Hendricks
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 840
Kristine M. Knowlton
Weber County Attorneys Office
2549 Washington Blvd, 7th Floor
Ogden, Utah 84401
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Lyle C. Hendricks
Attorney Pro-Se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

'J'.'TY
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
Petition for Writ of Error
Coram Nobis in Trial
Court.

Lyle C. Hendricks
Petitioner
v.

HAY o 1 1992

State of Utah

Case No: 18592

Respondent

Judge: David E. Roth
COMES NOW, Petitioner, Lyle C. Hendricks, pursuant to Rule 60 (B) and Rule 65 (B)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and for cause of action alleges as follows:
1.

A Commitment order was issued on the 22nd day of February, 1988 by
the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge of the Second District Court in and
for the County of Weber, State of Utah, in a criminal complaint which
had charged petitioner with Aggravated Robbery.

2.

That petitioner was sentenced to a term of 5 to life at the Utah State
Prison, plus 1 year enhancement for using a firearm.

3.

The judgement of conviction which resulted in the confinement
complained of has been reviewed on appeal. Petitioner's conviction was
appealed by his court appointed counsel and on or about February 5th
1990, petitioner's sentence was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals.

4.

That petitioner is currently located at the Utah State Prison, P.O. Box
250, Draper, Utah, 84020.
1

That petitioner's restraint by respondent is unlawful and unconstitutional
in that there was a substantial denial of his rights under the constitution
as follows:
A.

That counsel for petitioner failed to contact petitioner's previous
counsel to investigate and question the testimony of detective
Minor.

B.

That detective Minor assigned to the case lied under oath and
perjured himself in court by testifying that he and the petitioner had
a conversation in one of the jail interview rooms where detective
Minor, petitioner and the public defender were present. Where
detective Minor states that the public defender kept leaving the
interview room to go to where the video arraignments were being
held, then the public defender would return for a couple of
minutes and leave the room again until finally he came back and
said it was petitioners turn, that detective Minor testifies that
during this conversation in the jail interview room, that the
petitioner told him that he wanted some drugs, and petitioner went
on to tell detective Minor that he had been taking cocaine that day,
and was coming down and had, had a confrontation with an
individual and that he planned on killing the individual. Detective
Miner testifies that the petitioner was coming down off of the
cocaine, and he wanted to stay high, he did not want to back out
of it, and wanted to go through with the killing. (See Transcript
Exhibits)

2

Petitioner contends that the only conversation he had with
detective Minor was in the hallway. Where petitioner stopped
detective Minor and asked why he was being charged with a first
degree felony. Where in detective Minor stated, because a
firearm was used. The public defender who was representing the
petitioner has supplied an affidavit in which he supports the
petitioners contentions regarding this matter. (See Affidavit of
G. Scott Jensen)
Through diligence, Petitioner was finally able to bring to recall,
the facts by send attorney G. Scott Jensen, a photograph of
petitioner and trial transcripts, where upon Attorney G. Scott
Jensen sent petitioner an affidavit supporting his claims, which is
now "Newly Discovered Evidence", material for the party
making the petition, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at his trial". "Like wise,
petitioner did not, nor could not, produce this evidence at the time
of appeal.
Petitioner recalls this perjurious testimony being brought to the
attention of Kristine Knowlton, Deputy District Attorney and the
Honorable David E. Roth, in this Judge's Chambers, and that the
result of the trial would have been different, the court then
multiplied the error made by the officer by allowing it to be
introduced before the jury. There is no doubt that the error was
significantly prejudicial to the ability of the defendant to gain a fair

3

trial.
6.

That Pursuant to URCP Rule 65 B (i) (7) and URCP Rule 65 B (i) (9),
Petitioner request that this court, order the state to obtain such transcripts
of proceedings or court records as may be relevant and material to this
case and requests that the county in which petitioner was originally
charged be directed to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Wherefore, Petitioner prays that this Court:
1.

Schedule on evidentiary hearing at which time petitioner may be
present and represented by counsel.

2.

Permit petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments.

3.

Grant petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in Forma
Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in the
proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above.

4.

Issue an order for post conviction relief to have the petitioner
brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged from the
illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint.

Dated this

<&*

day of

Afi*>/

1992.

le C. Hendricks
Lyle
Attorney Pro-Se

A

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the forgoing Petition for
Writ of Error Coram Nobis and Post Conviction relief to Judge David E. Roth Second
District Court, 2549 Washington Blvd. Ogden, Utah, 84401 to the office of the court
clerk, Municipal Building, Ogden, Utah, 84401. And Reed M. Richards, Weber
County Attorney 7lh floor Municipal Bldg. Ogden, Utah, 84401.
This

3A^_day of

fl^ll

1992.

Lyle^C. Hendricks
Attorney Pro-Se

5
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEJER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
^°
rr.oo

LYLE C. HENDRICKS,
RULINlf ON PETITION ?©R
WRIT Of ERROR CORAM ^
NOBIS3N TRIAL COUR^

Plaintiff,
vs.

CO

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No.
en

Defendant.

671^918592 -

MAY t 5 1W2
Having examined the filed in the above entitled case, I
find

that

defendant's

petition

is

repetitious

of

motions

previously made and denied and I therefore am dismissing the
petition*
DATED this

/£

day of May, 1992.

Ruling on Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Trial Court
Case No. 87198592
Page 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
sent

a

true

and

correct

copy

of the

/s

day of Mayf 1992, I

foregoing

Ruling

on

Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Trial Court to counsel
as follows:
Lyle C. Hendricks
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Reed M. Richards
7th Floor Municipal Bldg
Ogden, Utah 84401

puty Court Clerk
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT .COURT^OF WEBER COUNTY,
STATE W liTA'fl 10 o5

Lyle C. Hendricks

WRIT OF
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF

Petitioner,

-v-

DEC 0 \ \9»

State Of Utah,
Respondent

case ito&pj

7 nos-7. v

MICHAEL D. LYOM

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this matter is invoked upon this court pursuant to the Utah and
the United States Constitutions. This matter is being filed under Rule 65 B Ut. R. C. P.
1 and 2. Petitioners claim is timely under Rule 65 in that he has been provided with
new evidence. Petitioner's confinement is a result of substantial denial of his rights at
trial.

FACTS
1.

Petitioner is currently confined at the Utah State Prison. This commitment was a

result of a jury trial where petitioner was found guilty of Aggravated Robbery.
Petitioner was sentenced in the District Court of Weber County on February 22, 1988
to a term of 5 years to life.
2.

Petitioner claims his constitutional rights have been violated in this trial. The

oot

record of the trial contains perjured testimony. This testimony and the prosecutions
referral to it during closing argument establish "intent" of the crime. Without this
perjured testimony petitioner would not have been found guilty of aggravated robbery.
3.

Petitioner also claims his rights were violated in that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel during his trial. Petitioners attorney refused to believe the
testimony of Det. Minor during trial was perjured. Petitioners attorney simply allowed
the testimony into the record unchallenged.
4.

Petitioner has appealed this conviction. These appeals have been denied.

The claims raised in this petition have not been appealed as they are based on newly
discovered evidence. This evidence was not available to petitioner at the time of trial
or during Filing of post conviction relief.
STATEMENT OF T H E
1.

ISSUES

Petitioner was found guilty of the offence of aggravated robbery. This trial by

jury establish petitioners presence during this alleged robbery. The evidence
however does not establish intent to commit aggravated robbery. The evidence does
show in fact nothing was taken during the robbery. Even that trial court agreed there
may be a question as to intent and agreed to allow jury instructions to include lesser
included offenses of attempted robbery. The prosecutor in his closing argument told
the jury they could find both the elements of the robbery and the intent to commit the
robbery in the testimony of Detective Minor.
2.

Detective Minor testified that petitioner confessed to him about the crime. Mr.

Minor said in his confession petitioner stated he needed to do the robbery to get drugs
2
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so he could go through with a killing. Mr. Minor testified this confession took place
with petitioners attorney, G. Scott Jensen present.
3.

During the testimony of Detective Minor petitioner objected. A conference was

held in judges chambers and petitioners trial counsel was told to contact Mr. Jensen.
At this point the court recognized if Det. Minor's testimony about the confession were
untrue the jury had been tainted and a mistrial would be in order. To now claim that
Det. Minor's testimony was not a major part of the juries verdict is an abuse of
discretion.
4.

Petitioner's trial attorney did not attempt to contact Mr. Jensen as the court

instructed. It is only through petitioners own efforts that he has obtained an affidavit
from Mr. Jensen. Petitioner's trial attorney was not acting in his best interest during
trial. His indifference allowed his perjured testimony to enter into the record and this
testimony played a major part in the juries verdict.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner's rights were substantially denied in this case. Perjured testimony is
and abuse of the system. To allow this testimony to go before a jury and play a major
part in their verdict is a constitutional violation of due process. This issue has not
been properly addressed and petitioner has a right to a hearing on this matter.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefor petitioner prays this court;
1.

Order petitioner be allowed to proceed in this matter without payment of costs.

3
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2.

Assume jurisdiction over this matter.

3.

Order briefing be done on this petition pursuant to rule 65-B U.R.C.P.

4.

Set a hearing for oral arguments.

5.

Order petitioners conviction be reversed.
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Ly\e(p. Hendricks
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
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OF WEBER COUNTY

JUDICIAL
DISTRICT
CO
STATE
OF UTAH

LYLE C. HENDRICKS,
\

RULING ON WRIT OF
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF

Plaintiff,

t

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant.

Case No.

i

920900575

J'V t 3 1993

Having examined the file in the above entitled case, I
find that defendant's petition is repetitious of motions
previously made and denied and I therefore am dismissing the
petition on the ground that is frivolous.

DATED this

/3* day of January, 1993.

MICHAEL J..£LASMANN, Judge

f\ «
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Ruling
Case No.
Page Two

920900575

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of January,

1993, I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to
counsel as follows:
Lyle C. Hendricks
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
Reed M. Richards
7th Floor Municipal Bldg.
Ogden, UT 84401

uty Cpurt Clerk
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OFirVE&ER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
PETITIONERS NOTICE
OF APPEAL

Lyle C. Hendricks
Plaintiff, Petitioner,
-v-

yAKftl®*-

State Of Utah,
Defendant, Respondent,

Case No: 920900575

Petitioner hereby notifies this court of his intention to appeal the judgement
entered in this matter by the Honorable Michael J. Glassmann, on January 12,1993.
Petitioner believes he is entitled to the relief sought in the writ and will file for such in
the Utah Court of Appeals.

Respectfully Submitted

Lyle^C. Hendricks, Petitioner

Date
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Petitioner hereby certifies that he mailed a copy of the attached Notice of Appeal to
the parties named below. This was done by placing copies in the U. S. mail postage
prepaid on the attached date.

Jan Graham, Attorney General, State of Utah
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Clerk of the Court
Second District Court
Ogden, Utah

84401

le*C. Hendricks, Petition*

Date
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